appl'n of overdetermin w/ derives from instinctl. theory to conflict theory of 2nd struc. of 4 appr

J. Arlow - Conflict Regress Sx Formn IJPA 1965
Helena Deutsch -
Nunberg cases Character Types

250
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly
Vol. 5, 1936
#13

THE PRINCIPLE OF MULTIPLE FUNCTION: OBSERVATIONS ON OVER-DETERMINATION

BY ROBERT WÄLDER (VIENNA)

The immediate occasion for the observations which follow is the new framing of the theory of anxiety which Freud has given in his book, Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety.[1] Formerly it was assumed that anxiety originated in the id as a direct result of excessive, unrelieved tension and that during this process the ego was somehow overtaken as a defenseless victim. This Freud now modifies by stating that in a situation of danger, that is, in a threat of oncoming excessive, unrelieved tension, the ego may anticipate the latter in the form of anxiety, and that this anticipation then becomes the immediate signal which tends to induce the organism to adjust itself so as to avoid the danger—for example, flight, or any other appropriate protective measure—and thereby anxiety fulfils a biological function. This conception was naturally not intended to upset or displace the older theory, nor did Freud intend to say that anxiety could be caused first in this and then in that manner. The conception is, rather, that both manifestations—anxiety overpowering the ego and anxiety as a signal through the ego serving a biological function—constitute two sides of one phenomenon. In other words, Freud describes the phenomenon both from the angle of the id and from that of the ego. This two-sided consideration gives rise to the presumption that the same method might be adopted and fundamentally applied to all psychic phenomena, and that a double or generally speaking multiple conception of each psychic action would not only be admissible but altogether necessary in the light of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis includes in the id everything by which man appears to be impelled to function, all the inner tendencies which influence him, each *vis a tergo*. The ego, on the other hand, represents the considered direction of man, all purposeful

[1] Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI.

activity. When it is cold outside and I think of my gloves before I leave the house, I offer a typical everyday example of the working of the ego. Psychoanalysis, in so viewing the id and the ego, thus perceives man's being both impulsively driven and his being purposefully directed. This point of view has consciously and deliberately neglected the important problem, which of the two should be considered as primary and which as secondary; the fact has been ignored that it is important that psychoanalysis know both phenomena as well as the fact that being driven is the primary. The problems connected with this question are not within the scope of this paper and we shall limit ourselves from the outset to the statement that both phenomena are dealt with in psychoanalysis. The id is, so to speak, the continuation of that which the biologist knows as peripheral steering tendencies of living organisms, and the ego is the representative of the central steering in an organism. The scheme of processes in the id would then be, in short: instinct—instinctual expression; those of the ego, however, are: task—task-solving, or attempted solution respectively. The ego always faces problems and seeks to find their solution. Each of man's actions has in every case to pass through the ego and is thus an attempt to solve a problem. Even in the extreme case of an action carried out under the pressure of impulse which may seem at first to be driven purely by the instincts, the ego contributes its part; the imperatively appearing demand for satisfaction is that problem proposed to the ego, the resulting action is the means to the solution of that problem.

If it is correct to designate the scheme of the processes in the ego as the attempted solution of problems, then we must further ask ourselves what those problems are to whose solution the ego is consecrated, in which characteristic types respectively can the manifold content of these actual appearing problems be classified. Some will clearly be those coming to the ego from without, or those which are placed before the ego by factors foreign to it, as, for instance, in the example of the impulsive action of the instinct. How many of such possible problems exist can be gathered by realizing how many agencies the ego faces. There

is first the id, the world of the instincts which approaches the ego with its claims; then there is the outside world with its demands on the individual; there is, finally, in growing proportions from a certain time forward in the development of the individual, the superego with its commands and prohibitions. They all demand something and they all place the ego before the problem of finding ways and means to meet those demands, that is, the problem of finding attempted solutions. In addition, we would consider as a fourth problem that which imposes itself on the ego through the compulsion to repeat. Although it is customary in psychoanalysis to consider the compulsion to repeat as part of the id (its lowermost layer), it nevertheless seems to us propitious to distinguish between the claims of those impulses which require concrete gratification and the demands of the tendencies to repeat and continue former actions, even those which are unpleasant, or, more correctly, to distinguish between these two sides of the instinctive impulsion, without the intention in so doing to give a more far-reaching opinion concerning the status of the compulsion to repeat. If we are permitted to speak in this connection of the compulsion to repeat as of an agency of its own, the ego appears to be solicited by concrete problems from four directions: from the outside world, from the compulsion to repeat, from the i and from the superego.

However, the rôle of the ego is not limited to this passivi alone. The situation is by no means so simple, the ego has more to do than merely to take orders and care for their execution. Rather, it develops toward the outer world, as well as toward the other agencies in man himself, its own peculiar activity. This activity may be characterized as striving to hold its own, and beyond this to assimilate in organic growth the outer world as well as the other agencies within the individual. This activity of the ego is first noticed in the ego's contact with the outer world. But it seems that also in its contact with the instinctual life there exists from the very beginning this trend to coördinate itself with its central steering—a fact which seems to be proven in that the ego experiences each excessive

crescendo of the instinctual forces as danger for itself and independently of any consequences menacing from the outside, a danger to be destroyed and its organization overwhelmed. Evidently, the ego has then also an active trend toward the instinctual life, a disposition to dominate or, more correctly, to incorporate it into its organization. The fact that there is a similar disposition of the ego towards the impulse to repeat, that the ego uses repetitions imposed on it by this deep-rooted disposition in order to overcome the menacing drives, has been emphasized by Freud from the very beginning when he introduced the concept of the compulsion to repeat.[1] In the real occurrence of the repetitions it is difficult to distinguish in how far the ego is subject to the compulsion from behind and in how far it uses it as a means to overcome the psychic experience; these two sides of the actual repetition can be separated only by abstraction. Furthermore, it would be fairly easy to illustrate by way of example that the ego also contains a similar tendency in its relationship to the superego.

The function of the ego is therefore not limited to finding attempted solutions for problems which are placed before it by the outer world, by the compulsion to repeat, by the id, by the superego, but in addition it assigns to *itself* definite problems, such as overcoming the other agencies or joining them to its organization by active assimilation. There are, then, eight problems whose solution is attempted by the ego: four of these are assigned to the ego and the other four the ego assigns to itself. Or, even, better there are eight *groups* of problems, since what we have termed as problems contains in each instance a *group* of problems. (For example, the problem of instinctual gratification assigned by the id naturally contains as many problems as there are instincts seeking gratification.) Thus, the occurrences within the ego can be described as distinct attempted solutions; man's ego is characterized through a number of specific methods of solution.

1 Freud: *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. Ges. Schr. VI. 202. (Trans. by C. J. M. Hubback, London, 1922); *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI. 110.

It appears now as if our psychic life were directed by a general principle which we may name the principle of multiple function. According to this principle no attempted solution of a problem is possible which is not of such a type that it does not at the same time, in some way or other, represent an attempted solution of *other* problems. Consequently, each psychic act can and must be conceived in every case as a simultaneous attempted solution of all eight problems, although it may be more successful as an attempted solution of one particular problem than of another.

In a consideration of this principle, it first occurs to us that it is fundamentally impossible that any sort of an attempted solution could answer to a like degree and with equal success all eight problems, for these problems are of inconsistent character. Above all, the problems of the first group which are assigned to the ego are at variance with those of the second which the ego assigns to itself. For instance, instinct gratification is at variance with instinct control, and fulfilment of the commands of the superego is in opposition to the assimilating victory over the superego. As a rule, there will be still other contrasts between the problems, as for instance between those of the id and those of the outer world or of the superego. And, finally, other possible variances are to be found within a problem group, as for instance when opposing impulses demand gratification, opposing superego demands occur in definite conflict rising against the claims of the not less contradictory outer world, etc. The whole complex of the problems whose solution is constantly attempted by the ego, is consequently inconsistent in three directions and a complete simultaneous solution of these eight problems is impossible. The character of each psychic act is thus proven to be a compromise, as psychoanalysis first discovered in the case of the neurotic symptom, which is a compromise between instinct and the defense against it. Perhaps this affords us a possible clue to the understanding of that sense of perpetual contradiction and feeling of dissatisfaction which, apart from neurosis, is common to all human beings.

It is thus fundamentally impossible for any psychic act to be to the same extent and with equal success an attempted solution for all and each of the several problems. If it is a necessary conclusion that under the principle of multiple function an attempted solution solves one problem with more success than the other, then we can understand the unique position of all psychic acts which approach such a far-reaching solution. This is in the first place true of the act of love if it is to combine completeness of physical gratification with a happy relationship. Fulfilment of the instinctual need, the deepest repetition impulse, a satisfaction of the demand of the superego, and the claims of reality are all contained therein as well as the redemption and the self-discovery of the ego in face of all those realities. It appears now that the unique importance of the act of love in the psychic household is to be understood as that psychic act which comes nearest to a complete solution of all the contradictory problems of the ego. Consequently, if each psychic act is in some way—no matter how imperfectly—an attempted solution of all other problems which are found in the ego, this is only possible because each psychic act is of multiple meaning. If perchance the work on a machine which in the first place is an attempted solution of the adjustment to the outer world, becomes even imperfectly an instinctual gratification, this is possible only because the work on the machine has in addition some other meaning. In other words: a multiple meaning corresponds to a multiple function.

These considerations bring us in close touch with one of the oldest and most familiar concepts of psychoanalysis—over-determination. It is over-determination which as one of the most fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis most clearly distinguishes it from other psychological schools. This concept was introduced into psychoanalysis, as a result of empirical observation, first as something accidental which might or perhaps might not exist in a world more or less replete with diversity. Where it appeared, over-determination was explained by the fact that a psychic trend alone was not yet equivalent to psychic effectiveness and that only the conjunction of several trends would, so to speak, exceed the boundary value of psychic effectiveness. It is clear that this conception has been built up in analogy to those of the older neurology and that it shows a logical difficulty: there can be a complete determination—natural science knows the concept of the necessary and adequate causes—and as long as one remains within the sphere of natural science, it is difficult to understand in how far an occurrence should be determined more than adequately. In mathematics over-determination is even nonsensical: a triangle is adequately determined by three determining components; it is over-determined by four, i.e., in general, impossible. In psychoanalysis over-determination meets further a practical difficulty: in psychoanalytical application, psychoanalytical hermeneutics, the introduction of the concept of over-determination yields neither a guiding point nor a boundary for the expected reconstructions; over-determination opens onto infinity, as it were, and there is no principle of psychoanalytical hermeneutics that can set down any sort of postulate as to how far over-determination reaches and when it may be considered exhausted.

The principle of multiple function is perhaps in a position to meet all these difficulties. It is free from faults in logic for it no longer affirms that a psychic act is determined beyond its own complete determination, but only that it must have more than one sense, that even if initiated as an attempted solution for one definite problem, it must also, at the same time and in some way, be an attempted solution for other specific problems. The whole phenomenon of the multiple function and of the multiple meaning of each psychic act, then, is not—in analogy to the older neurology—to be understood through any sort of conception of a summation of stimuli and threshold values, but—parallel to the concepts of newer neurology and biology—is to be understood as the expression of the collective function of the total organism. Since the organism always reacts in its entirety and since all these problems are constantly living within it, each attempted solution of a problem must be conjointly determined, modified and arranged through the

existence and the working of the other, until it can serve, even if imperfectly, as an attempted solution for all these problems and thus necessarily preserve its multiple meaning. There is nothing of the happen-chance in this procedure which may appear in one case and not in another; it naturally follows from the structure of the psychic organism. Finally, we have now a definite guide for psychoanalytic hermeneutics. The multiple meaning of a psychic act is clearly exhausted if it is interpreted as an attempted solution for all eight problems or, more correctly expressed, for the problems of all eight groups. The multiple meaning naturally has not ceased to be infinite, but there are certain directions marked out in this infinity. The valency which must be attributed to these various meanings is certainly not affected.

The principle of multiple function permits a series of applications of which only a few shall be outlined. In the first place, it explains pansexualism which has been made a basis for reproach to psychoanalysis, i.e., the propensity of psychoanalysis to look for a sexual meaning in all matters even when its realistic interpretation yielded a complete meaning. Inasmuch as each psychic act has a multiple function and therefore a multiple meaning and since one of these functions and meanings will refer to the problem of instinctual gratification (furthermore, the instinctual life of man is never entirely dormant), obviously everything that man does, all his purposeful action directed toward reality, must contain the elements of instinctual gratification. Thus, it is essential for psychoanalysis that it should in addition attribute a particular rôle to the drive for instinctual gratification and consider it, as a rule, the motor of what occurs. This second trait of psychoanalysis, as also the question of primary existence, will not be considered here; it follows from the principle of multiple function why it is admissible and proper to explain each phenomenon according to its sexual content.

The principle explains also the importance of sexuality for character development. Character is very largely determined

through specific solution methods which are peculiar to each individual and which remain relatively constant during the course of time. However, in accordance with the principle of multiple function, these methods of solution must be so formed that they represent also a gratification for the dominant instincts of this person. If now the instinctual life is considered chronologically the prior and dynamically the more powerful in the whole structure, it follows that the dominant instincts influence the selection with regard to the choice of methods of solution possible for the given individual. In other words, the principle of multiple function proves the importance of instinctual life in the process of character formation. This subject will be further discussed when we consider the problem of psychoanalytical characterology.

The specific reactions to love and work in an individual manifest themselves as the expression of the principle of multiple function. They mean that a person is successful in loving or working (that is, in solving the respective problems) only when other specific impulses are thereby simultaneously gratified. From this one gains insight into such phenomena as anticathexis, reaction-formations, sublimation. Sublimations, for example, can definitely be termed such successful solutions of the problem of adaptation to the outer world or of mastering the outer world, as simultaneously and in accordance with another meaning which they carry, they represent successful gratifications of strong impulses. Through this principle it is further understandable that the orgastic experience of the psychically abundant, diversified person can be much more intense and of quite another quality than the orgastic experience of the less abundant and more superficial individual. For in the case of the more abundant individual who has in himself a more diversified set of problems, many more meanings converge at the time of the orgasm in the happy love relationship, and the act can represent a simultaneous solution in several trends. In the light of this principle, it would seem that psychoanalysis is a kind of polyphonic theory of the psychic

ic in which each act is a chord, and in which there is consonance and dissonance.[1]

Above all, the principle seems to throw a certain light on three problems, on the problem of neurosis, that of character, and that of clinical manifestations. Neurosis in psychoanalysis was originally conceived as a compromise between two trends; thereby it was subject to at least two functions and meanings. Generalized, one may say that neurosis, as all other psychic phenomena, is a simultaneous attempted solution for every type of problem in the ego, and that it has accordingly the same abundance of meanings as corresponds to the contemporary psychoanalytical concept of the neurosis. A number of theories on neurosis have been formed with psychoanalysis alone or partially as basis. The first and simplest is that conceived by Adler, which sees in the neurosis merely the solution of one of the eight problems—the solution of the problem of how to master the outer world.[2] Since there are eight problems, eight such theories are obviously possible, each of which reflects only one side of the neurosis. Those theories which place the neurosis on two foundations go a step farther. They consider it the simultaneous solution of two problems—as for instance, instinctual gratification and punishment. A simple contemplation reveals that twenty-eight such theories are possible if one views these traits as having an equal right in the neurosis. A further amplification might be effected if one feature were subordinated to the other; for instance, punishment for the sake of instinctual gratification (incidentally, this last formula follows the theory of Alexander). A reverse subordination might also be visualized. If one were to unearth such possible theories—theories which view the neurosis as the simultaneous solution of three or more problems—and in addition to consider the possibility of subordinating one problem to the other, the number of such theories of the neurosis would reach many tens of thousands. The value of these conceptions—as for instance Alexander's—would not be affected thereby. We may voice the expectation that these theories will not all be developed, for the principle of multiple function includes them all, leaving the study of the distribution of the valencies and of the various forces to which they are subjected to the investigation of specific clinical conditions or perhaps to the special theory of neuroses.

Then, too, certain statements can be made concerning the possibilities of a psychoanalytic characterology. The character of a person, as has already been mentioned, is determined through specific methods of solution in typical situations, which methods the person retains permanently (through the nature of his preferred attempted solutions). Thus expressed, it would seem at first glance that the character had no immediate connection with the instinctual life or the superego, for instinctual life and superego determine the *content* of problem groups, not the specific methods of solution which, *for* these problems, are selected by the ego. In the presence of any kind of instinctual disposition and for the purpose of its gratification, a great number of attempted solutions and accordingly a great many character types would be possible. On the other hand, however, this is opposed by the psychoanalytic experience that certain instinctual constitutions are accompanied by certain types of character, perhaps not with inevitable regularity but with a proven frequency. It is at this point that the principle of multiple function asserts itself. According to this principle the specific methods of solution for the various problems in the ego must always be so chosen that they, whatever may be their

[1] Accordingly, those phenomena are also embraced in this principle which must be ascribed to the "synthetic function of the ego". What impresses one as its characteristic synthetic function is that each act in the ego has a multiple function.

[2] It is understood, of course, that this is not the whole difference between psychoanalysis and individual psychology. For quite apart from the fact that psychoanalysis takes multiple motivation into consideration, it does not place equal value on each of the multiple meanings. In psychoanalysis the instinctual is sometimes considered as primary, while in individual psychology it is the being directed which is considered as primary and the instinctual life is seen as an expression of this being directed. This question, which can be called one of ontological primacy, will not be considered in this paper. It forms the central point of another work by the author which appeared in the *Verhandlungen der Internationalen Gesellschaft für angewandte Psychologie und Psychopathologie*, edited by C. Bonhoeffer and published by Karger in Berlin.

immediate objective, carry with them at the same time gratification of the instincts. However, in the face of the dynamic strength of human instinctual life this means that the instincts play the part of choosing among the possible methods of solution in such a way that preferably those attempted solutions which also represent gratification of the dominant impulses will appear and maintain themselves.

This relation between a preferred attempted solution and the instinctual life may be illustrated by two simple examples. The first is the relation of oral impulse presentation and identification, made familiar to psychoanalysis primarily through Abraham's works. Identification is an attempted solution in a definite problem situation. It may be termed a character trait when a person in a certain situation of instinct, of superego demands, and of difficulties with the outer world, regularly finds the way out into identification as his specific method of solution in a diversified situation. Now we know that this propensity toward identification is developed particularly in the case of the oral character and we understand this factual association without further explanation. From the various methods of solution which are possible in the same diversified problem situations, the method represented by identification will be chosen preponderantly by persons in whom exist strong oral drives. This for the reason that in addition to everything else for which it is an attempted solution, identification realizes the gratification of those very oral impulse dispositions. Therefore in this case the oral impulse operates in a selective way—which is shown by the fact that among the possible methods of solution always those materialize which gratify the oral desires. A similar relation seems to exist between the disposition to passive homosexuality and the solution method of paranoid projection. In a situation of conflict each method of solution which perceives an experience as coming from the outside and itself passively surrendering to these outside forces, is an attempted solution for certain problems, is gratification of love and hate relationships, defense reaction, and others such. Moreover, the attempted solution (the projection) is itself a

gratification of the passive homosexual impulse tendency. This perhaps renders understandable why this mechanism (that is, attempted solution) of the paranoid projection appears even exclusively or preferably in the case of passive homosexual impulse disposition—which is to say that perhaps thereby the association of homosexuality and paranoia, for the time being purely empirical, becomes understandable.[1]

Let us turn back now to psychoanalytic characterology. We have seen that the right to set up character types according to the dominant impulses (for instance, to speak of anal, oral, or genital character) rests in the fact that according to the principle of multiple function the preferred methods of solution must be of such quality that as such (that is, as methods of solution according to the meaning of the act) they simultaneously represent gratification of dominant instincts, and that the person with a marked dominant impulse preferably inclines toward a certain method of solution. Here the word *inclines* must be emphasized, for on account of the enormous complexity of the problems constantly operating in the ego, the function involved cannot be one of exclusive validity. Also, in the case of an oral character, we naturally find other methods of solution than identification, the relationship between dominant impulses and preferred methods of solution being but one of a statistic frequency. However, for a future psychoanalytical characterology this carries with it the consequence that these methods cannot be linear but must be at least two-dimensional according to the dominant impulses and specific methods of solution, between which, of course, certain statistical relations will exist.

The examples mentioned, in which a method of solution (i.e., a certain element of form in the psychic life) is associated with dominant drives (i.e., contents) finally lead to the third phenomenon to which our principle opens up an approach: to the problem of form. This is just the problem which does not appear accessible from the psychoanalytical point of view which

[1] These explanations apply to masculine paranoiacs and are not to be transferred to the apparently fundamental complicated associations in women.

deals primarily with the psychology of ideational content. However, the principle of multiple function shows us that the forms of reactions appearing in the ego cannot be independent of the contents for they must be so constituted that according to their signification they appear at the same time also as attempted solutions of the content problems, as for instance instinctual gratifications. Thus, in one of the above examples, the settlement of certain conflicts of content through their projection—the specific paranoid mechanism—is doubtlessly something formal in the psychic life, and yet this form is not independent of the content (in the case of this example, of the instinctual life) because this form preferably appears in the case of an instinctual constellation which can also be satisfied through it or through its meaning. Hence it can be said that according to the principle of multiple function the content of the psychic life, above all of the instinctual life, has its importance for the choice of the forms of solution—briefly, for the form—and what possibilities there are in the treatment of formal problems in psychoanalysis is shown. One need not mention particularly that the problem of form in the psychic is in no way exhausted with the aforesaid.

The principle of multiple function may have its part, too, in social psychology. It implies the consideration of typically social phenomena in multiple function, that is, an historic movement with regard to its economic side (adjustment to the outer world or overcoming the outer world) with allowance for instinctual gratification, collective ideals, etc.

Finally, we may look for the operation of this principle even in dream life; the dream is the sphere wherein over-determination was originally discovered. Nevertheless, the general character of dreams remains the reduction of the psychic experience as well in relation to its content (receding of the superego and of the active problems of the ego) as in relation to the way of working (substitution of the manner of working of the unconscious for the manner of working of the conscious in attempted solutions) and finally in the chronological sense (receding of the actual in favor of the past). In consideration of all these reduc-

tion or regression developments which mean a change in th problems and a reversion in the specific methods of solutic from the manner of working of the conscious to the manner working of the unconscious, the dream phenomena can also explained through the principle of multiple function. Eve occurrence in the dream appears then likewise in eightfo function or clearly in eight groups of meaning. The distin tion of the dream is characterized only through the change the shifting of the problems and through the relapse in th manner of working.

The question may now be asked, in what various ways there a progressive development or change in the psychic li to which an individual is subject and which types of su change can be distinguished. Since each psychic act is at th same time an attempted solution of different problems, th psychic act necessarily changes itself when the problems chan Thus there is change or development on the basis of change development of the instinctual life, of the outer world, or of t superego. Hence, through the biologically predetermin development of the instinctual life other problems w approach the ego in puberty than in the period before puber and accordingly change all happenings in the ego, all attempt solutions. The changing of the outer world places the in vidual at times before changed problems. We can also spe of a development of the superego. The superego itself or inated as an attempted solution in a situation of conflict, th becoming constantly more and more independent, it had own development. These possibilities are covered by statement that psychic problems change their content; it co be amplified by saying that problems actively assigned by ego itself have a progressive development as far as their cont is concerned. Furthermore, we have the development of *methods* of solution with two points to be distinguished; development of the manner of working from the primit archaic to other forms, such as from the manner of wo ing of the unconscious to the manner of working of conscious, or from the magical thinking and experiencing

certain childish stage to the thinking of the adult, etc., etc. The development of the methods of solution peculiar to the individual—which development constitutes that of the character and of the ego in the narrower sense. Finally, to be added as a further round of development, we have the fact that each attempted solution issuing from the ego already carries within itself the tendency to its destruction, for scarcely is it fixed than it no longer constitutes a solution. Through each act the world is changed in all its elements; for instance, the outer world is changed generally, and something in the instincts is changed by what this act contains in the way of gratification or denial, and so on. To use a crude example: he who takes up a calling as an attempted solution of a situation of outer world claims, instinctual pressure, superego demands, and pressure of the compulsion to repeat, also as an attempt to master the compulsion to repeat, the drive of the instincts, the inner commands and the outer world claims, that person has through his exercise of calling created a new piece of reality; now a new outer world is there which sets up claims and which the ego tries to master, the new situation must change something in the desires emanating from the instincts, certain superego demands perhaps recede while others advance, etc. In short, through the attempted solution itself everything is changed, so that now new problems approach the ego and the attempted solution fundamentally is such no more. Thus in addition to the change of the various problem-assigning agencies, as for instance of instinctual life, and in addition to the development of the *methods* of solution, we may consider as a basis for the psychic development the property inherent in each attempted solution to cease being such with its fixation.

We see accordingly that an aspect of enormous many-sidedness of motivation and meaning of psychic occurrences results from psychoanalysis. Freud, in distinction from the other psychological schools, has from the very beginning founded the psychoanalytical way of thinking on the importance of the *vis a tergo* and the dependencies of the ego, and on the other hand also clearly rejected a demonological theory of psychic life.[1] The diversity of these associations may make it advisable to adopt a certain caution regarding premature simplification.

The conceptions of id, ego, and superego have not been used in this article in the sense of sharply distinguished parts of the personality. Rather does the application of our principle show that these elements are to be conceived as different factors evidenced in each psychic act of the adult human. The individual actions and fantasies have each their ego, their id, and their superego phase, as well as a phase conforming to the compulsion to repeat. According to this principle an eight-sided aspect can be demonstrated.

Finally, we may add some few remarks of an anthropological nature. It will seem to us as if these three elements of psychoanalysis—the phases of the psychic experience—correspond at the same time to stages in the organic life. The instinctual urge probably appears in all organic life. The ego, or something morphologically similar, appears where there is a central steering in the organism—which apparently corresponds to the severance of the individual from the botanical associations and the zoölogical individualization, but which may perhaps be attained only with the appearance of the central nervous system. The superego is the domain of the human being; it is that element through which man in his experience steps beyond himself and looks at himself as the object—be it in a way aggressively penalizing, tenderly cherishing, or dispassionately neutral—as, for instance, in the case of self-observation and the ability of abstracting one's self from one's own point of view.

Here belongs the ability to see a garden as a garden regardless of the place of observation, or the ability not only to experience the world in its momentary instinctual and interest phases but also to recognize that the individual is independent of his own ego and that this independence outlives his own ego. In this sense it is a function of the superego when man as the only

[1] Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.* Ges. Schr. XI, 32.

sion of the superego that man is distinguished from animal is proven by everything we know of animal psychology. Unfortunately, this subject cannot be further discussed within the scope of our present article. There is always the possibility of transcending the instinct and interest foundation in a given situation, of stepping beyond thinking, experiencing, acting—in short, of placing one's self in the realm of the superego. If this be true, it would seem that by Freud's choice of elements we have found the stages of everything organic: organic life itself, the central steering of the organism after the individuation of organic life, and finally man's reaching beyond himself. Perhaps the principle of multiple function in man's psychology is paralleled by a similar principle in animal life, though naturally with a lesser diversity on account of the poorer problem situation.

Translated by MARJORIE HAEBERLIN MILDE